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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge
 
. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from 
the District Court’s partial final judgment entered pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) in favor of four of the 
five defendants in this action, the Institutional Defendants, 
following the Court’s conclusion that it lacked personal 
jurisdiction over two of these defendants and that the applicable 
statutes of limitations barred the plaintiff’s claim against all four 
Institutional Defendants.  Plaintiff, now appellant, Brian Elliott 
brought this action against the Institutional Defendants, i.e., the 
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Archdiocese of New York (“the Archdiocese”), the Church of 
the Nativity of Our Blessed Lady (“the Church”), The Marist 
Brothers of the Schools, Inc. (“the Marist Brothers”), and Mt. 
St. Michael’s School (“Mt. St. Michael’s”), and an individual 
defendant, Brother Damian Galligan, seeking monetary damages 
for personal injuries that Elliott allegedly suffered as a result of 
Galligan’s sexual abuse of him beginning in 1977, when he was 
eight years old, and continuing until 1983.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  
 
  
II.  FACTUAL HISTORY 
 
 The Archdiocese, a Roman Catholic entity and a 
governing organization of the Catholic Church, is incorporated 
in the State of New York with its principal place of business in 
New York City.  The Church of the Nativity, a private religious 
organization and parish under the Archdiocese, also is 
incorporated in the State of New York with its principal place of 
business in New York City.  The Marist Brothers is a religious 
order.  It is incorporated in the State of New York and serves 
mass at the Church of the Nativity.  Mt. St. Michael’s is 
incorporated in the State of New York as a private religious high 
school and is located in New York City.  During the period that 
he allegedly abused Elliott, Galligan was a brother of the Marist 
Order, taught at Mt. St. Michael’s, and performed services at the 
Church.  Elliott was raised in the State of New Jersey, lived in 
that state during the alleged abuse, and is still a resident and 
citizen of that state.   
 Elliott’s grandmother, who lived in the Bronx, New 
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York, and was a parishioner of the Church of the Nativity, 
introduced Elliott to Galligan.  Galligan came to know Elliott’s 
entire family but developed an especially close relationship with 
Elliott.  Beginning in the fall of 1977, when Elliott was eight 
years old, Galligan allegedly began to sexually assault Elliott.  
Elliott charges that Galligan continued his abuse on a regular 
basis between 1977 and 1983 at various locations in New York 
and New Jersey.  Elliott also asserts that Galligan abused him in 
Virginia and in Delaware where he took Elliott on two out-of-
state trips.   
 
III.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Elliott originally filed his complaint in the Superior Court 
of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, on June 23, 2009.  
Elliott thereafter filed an amended complaint, in which he 
alleged that there was an agency relationship between Galligan 
and the Institutional Defendants.  In this vein, Elliott contended 
that the Institutional Defendants employed Galligan at all 
relevant times and were responsible for his supervision.  Elliott 
maintained that the Institutional Defendants gave Galligan the 
power to act on their behalf, and that all of Galligan’s actions 
with respect to Elliott fell within the scope of that authority, 
were connected to Galligan’s routine job duties, and were for 
the benefit of the Institutional Defendants.  Elliott asserted also 
that the Institutional Defendants ratified, or, at a minimum, did 
not repudiate Galligan’s abuse of him to the extent that the 
abuse may have occurred outside the scope of the authority that 
the Institutional Defendants granted to Galligan.  In this vein, 
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Elliott alleged that the Institutional Defendants had actual or 
constructive knowledge of Galligan’s sexual abuse of Elliott.   
 On the basis of these and other allegations that Elliott 
made concerning the Institutional Defendants’ awareness of 
ongoing sexual abuse of children in the Catholic Church 
generally, Elliott contended that the Institutional Defendants had 
a duty to prevent Galligan from abusing him and to establish 
measures to protect him against such abuse.  Elliott alleged that 
the Institutional Defendants, acting negligently and grossly 
negligently, breached those duties causing Elliott mental, 
emotional, and physical injury.  In addition to Elliott’s claim that 
the Institutional Defendants were negligent, his complaint 
included a number of other theories of liability, including breach 
of fiduciary duty, assault and battery, fraud, breach of an implied 
contract, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting.   
Defendants removed this action to the District Court on 
the basis of diversity of citizenship.  Thereafter, the Archdiocese 
and the Church of the Nativity moved under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) to dismiss all claims against them on 
the ground that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. 
 Alternatively, they sought a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on 
the ground that New York law applied to Elliott’s claims and the 
action was untimely under New York’s statutes of limitations 
such that Elliott failed to state a claim.  Elliott responded that the 
Court possessed personal jurisdiction over those defendants and 
that Delaware law applied, such that his claims were timely 
under the Delaware Child Victim’s Act of 2007 (the “CVA”), 
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Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8145(a)-(b) (Supp. 2010).1
                                                 
1In relevant part, the CVA provides: 
 
 
(a) A cause of action based upon the sexual abuse 
of a minor by an adult may be filed in the 
Superior Court of this State at any time following 
the commission of the act or acts that constituted 
the sexual abuse. A civil cause of action for 
sexual abuse of a minor shall be based upon 
sexual acts that would constitute a criminal 
offense under the Delaware Code. 
 
(b)  For a period of 2 years following July 9, 
2007, victims of child sexual abuse that occurred 
in this State who have been barred from filing suit 
against their abusers by virtue of the expiration of 
the former civil statute of limitations, shall be 
permitted to file those claims in the Superior 
Court of this State.  If the person committing the 
act of sexual abuse against a minor was employed 
by an institution, agency, firm, business, 
corporation, or other public or private legal entity 
that owned [sic] a duty of care to the victim, or 
the accused and the minor were engaged in some 
activity over which the legal entity had some 
degree of responsibility or control, damages 
against the legal entity shall be awarded under this 
subsection only if there is a finding of gross 
negligence on the part of the legal entity. 
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On December 21, 2009, the District Court granted the 
Archdiocese’s and the Church’s motion, finding that it could not 
exercise personal jurisdiction over either defendant.  
Alternatively, the Court concluded that New York law applied 
under Delaware’s choice-of-law jurisprudence and that New 
York’s statutes of limitations barred Elliott’s claims.2  See 
Elliott v. The Marist Bros. of the Schs., Inc.
                                                                                                             
 
, 675 F. Supp. 2d 
454 (D. Del. 2009).  Elliott subsequently moved for the Court to 
reconsider its order on the basis of an October 5, 2009 bench 
ruling that a judge of the Delaware Superior Court issued in a 
group of cases not involving Elliot that included allegations of 
sexual abuse against Catholic institutions similar to those Elliott 
brought against the Institutional Defendants.  Elliott contended 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8145(a)-(b).  In Sheehan v. Oblates of 
St. Francis de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247, 1258-60 (Del. 2011), the 
Delaware Supreme Court upheld the CVA against facial 
constitutional challenges.    
 
2In this action, in which jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of 
citizenship, the District Court in Delaware applied Delaware 
choice of law principles.  See Petrella v. Kashlan, 826 F.2d 
1340, 1343 (3d Cir. 1987).  This choice of law led the Court to 
dismiss the case because it applied New York substantive law, 
which requires contract and fraud actions to be filed within six 
years and personal injury actions to be filed within three years of 
the accrual of the cause of action.  See N.Y.C.P.L.R. §§ 203(a), 
213(2), 213(8), 214(5) (McKinney 2003).  We do not here reach 
the question of whether that application of New York 
substantive law was correct.  
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that application of the Superior Court’s interpretation of the 
CVA in his case would have allowed the Court to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the Institutional Defendants and 
allowed the Court to apply Delaware law.  The Court denied 
Elliott’s motion.   
The Marist Brothers and Mt. St. Michael’s answered 
Elliott’s complaint without objecting to the District Court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over them.  Later, however, those 
entities moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 
12(c) on the basis of the portion of the Court’s December 21 
decision regarding the application of New York law and its 
statutes of limitations.  On September 21, 2010, the Court 
granted the Marist Brothers’ and Mt. St. Michael’s’ motion, as it 
followed its prior ruling that New York law applied and barred 
Elliott’s claims.   
Galligan answered Elliott’s complaint, and the claims 
against him remain pending before the District Court.  That 
Court, however, has stayed those proceedings during our 
consideration of this appeal.   
After the Marist Brothers and Mt. St. Michael’s filed 
their motion for judgment on the pleadings but before the 
District Court granted that motion, the Archdiocese and the 
Church on September 16, 2010, moved for entry of final 
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b).  Then, after the Court granted 
the Marist Brothers’ and Mt. St. Michael’s’ motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, all four of the Institutional Defendants and 
Elliott filed a joint stipulation requesting the entry of final 
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) in accordance with the Court’s 
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disposition of the case against all four of the Institutional 
Defendants.  On November 30, 2010, the Court denied the 
Archdiocese’s and the Church’s prior Rule 54(b) motion, stating 
that “[t]he court generally does not enter judgment against 
parties following motions to dismiss.”  Appellant’s resp. to the 
Clerk’s order of July 12, 2011 (“Appellant’s resp.”) tab C at 2.  
Instead, the Court on November 30, 2010, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b) certified for interlocutory appeal its orders dismissing 
Elliott’s claims as to all the Institutional Defendants.  Elliott, 
however, did not file a petition for leave to file an interlocutory 
appeal, and neither the parties nor the Court took any further 
action in this case for approximately the next six months.   
On May 27, 2011, the Institutional Defendants and Elliott 
once again filed a stipulation and proposed order requesting the 
entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b).  This time, on June 9, 
2011, the District Court adopted the parties’ proposed order and 
directed the entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b) in favor of 
the Institutional Defendants.  In doing so, the Court recited the 
procedural history of the case, and stated that the parties “have 
conferred and respectfully request the entry of final judgments 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) so that 
[Elliott’s] appeals may proceed before the Third Circuit and may 
be resolved with finality prior to any trial going forward in this 
matter.”  It thereafter directed that final judgments be entered 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) for the Institutional Defendants.  
Appellant’s resp. tab A at 1-3.  The Court did not, however, 
expressly determine that there was “no just reason for delay” in 
the entry of a final judgment, an omission that, as we shall see, 
has dispositive consequences for this appeal, nor did it set forth 
a statement of reasons supporting its entry of a Rule 54(b) 
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judgment.   
Following Elliott’s filing of a notice of appeal, the Clerk 
of this Court on July 12, 2011, ordered the parties to file briefs 
on the issue of whether the District Court’s certification satisfied 
the requirements of Rule 54(b) such that we could exercise 
jurisdiction over the appeal.  In her order, the Clerk indicated 
that the “orders appealed from do not dismiss all claims as to all 
parties and do not appear to have been properly certified under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).”  The parties thereafter filed briefs on this 
issue, all contending that the District Court’s order of June 9, 
2011, satisfies the provisions of Rule 54(b).  On October 12, 
2011, a motions panel of this Court referred the jurisdictional 
question to the merits panel and instructed the parties to address 
the issue further in their briefs on the merits.  In the time from 
the parties’ receipt of our Clerk’s order until the day of the oral 
argument on this appeal none of the parties asked the District 
Court to amend the June 9, 2011 order to overcome the possible 
jurisdictional problem the Clerk identified in her July 12, 2011 
order or moved that we remand the matter to the District Court 
so that the parties could ask it to do so.   
 
IV.  JURISDICTION 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1332.  The parties 
contend that we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
by virtue of the District Court’s entry of a final judgment 
pursuant to Rule 54(b).  The parties, however, cannot by their 
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consent vest this Court with jurisdiction over this appeal.  
Rather, as always, we must satisfy ourselves that we have 
jurisdiction.  See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 
U.S. 43, 73, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 1071 (1997) (“[E]very federal 
appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only 
of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a 
cause under review, even though the parties are prepared to 
concede it.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 
Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104 (1982) (“[N]o 
action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon 
a federal court.”); In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 372 F.3d 154, 161 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (“Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by 
consent of the parties.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc.
 Our jurisdictional inquiry must precede any discussion of 
the merits of the case for if a court lacks jurisdiction and opines 
on a case over which it has no authority, it goes “beyond the 
bounds of authorized judicial action and thus offends 
fundamental principles of separation of powers.”  
, 357 F.3d 
392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[P]arties may not confer subject 
matter jurisdiction by consent.”).   
Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 
1012 (1998); see also Cunningham v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 392 F.3d 
567, 570 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We must resolve the threshold 
jurisdictional issue before reaching the merits . . . .”).  
Accordingly, if we determine that we do not have jurisdiction 
over this appeal, our “only function remaining [will be] that of 
announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”  Steel Co., 523 
U.S. at 94, 118 S.Ct. at 1012 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 
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U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)). 
 
V.  ANALYSIS 
 A.  A District Court’s Obligations Under Rule 54(b) 
“This Court’s appellate jurisdiction is conferred and 
limited by Congress’s grant of authority.”   Berckeley Inv. Grp., 
Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Berckeley I”) 
(citing Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) 
(“Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as 
the statute confers.”)).  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, “[t]he courts of 
appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final 
decisions of the district courts of the United States.”  Generally, 
an order which terminates fewer than all claims pending in an 
action or claims against fewer than all the parties to an action 
does not constitute a “final” order for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 431-
32, 76 S.Ct. 895, 897-98 (1956); Carter v. City of Phila.
In a case such as this one that is before a court of appeals 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), the court’s jurisdiction thus “depends 
upon whether the district court properly granted 54(b) 
certification.”  
, 181 
F.3d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1999).  Under Rule 54(b), however, a 
district court may convert an order adjudicating less than an 
entire action to the end that it becomes a “final” decision over 
which a court of appeals may exercise jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.   
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Phila. Elec. Co., 521 
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F.2d 360, 362 (3d Cir. 1975).  Rule 54(b) (emphasis added) 
provides: 
Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving 
Multiple Parties. When an action presents more 
than one claim for relief — whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim — 
or when multiple parties are involved, the court 
may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if 
the court expressly determines that there is no just 
reason for delay.  Otherwise, any order or other 
decision, however designated, that adjudicates 
fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not 
end the action as to any of the claims or parties 
and may be revised at any time before the entry of 
a judgment
By allowing a district court to enter a final judgment on an order 
adjudicating only a portion of the matters pending before it in 
multi-party or multi-claim litigation and thus allowing an 
immediate appeal, Rule 54(b) “attempts to strike a balance 
between the undesirability of piecemeal appeals and the need for 
making review available at a time that best serves the needs of 
the parties.”  
 adjudicating all the claims and all the 
parties’ rights and liabilities. 
Allis-Chalmers, 521 F.2d at 363.3
                                                 
3 A Rule 54(b) entry of final judgment may have consequences 
beyond allowing an immediate appeal as it may allow execution 
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Certification of a judgment as final under Rule 54(b) is 
the exception, not the rule, to the usual course of proceedings in 
a district court.  “Not all final judgments on individual claims 
should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some 
sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims.  The 
function of the district court under the Rule is to act as a 
dispatcher.”  Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 
8, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 1465 (1980) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); see also Panichella v. Pa. R.R. Co., 252 F.2d 
452, 455 (3d Cir. 1958) (“[Rule] 54(b) orders should not be 
entered routinely or as a courtesy or accommodation to counsel. 
 The power which this Rule confers upon the trial judge should 
be used only in the infrequent harsh case as an instrument for 
the improved administration of justice and the more satisfactory 
disposition of litigation in the light of the public policy indicated 
by statute [28 U.S.C. § 1291] and rule.”) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  Rule 54(b) thus requires that a 
district court first determine whether there has been an ultimate 
disposition on a cognizable claim for relief as to a claim or party 
such that there is a “final judgment.”  Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 
U.S. at 7, 100 S.Ct. at 1464.4
                                                                                                             
on a judgment, a procedure that otherwise might not be 
available.  See 10 J. Moore et al. Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 
54.26 [4] at 54-92 (3d ed. 1997). 
  If it determines that there has been 
such a disposition, “the district court must go on to determine 
whether there is any just reason for delay,” taking into account 
4 Of course, certain orders lack sufficient finality so that a 
district court cannot certify them as final under Rule 54(b).  
Thus, it could not be suggested that an order denying a motion 
for summary judgment could be certified as final under the rule. 
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“judicial administrative interests as well as the equities 
involved.”  Id.
This latter requirement, that a district court “must go on 
to determine whether there is any just reason for delay,” is not 
merely formalistic.  Rule 54(b) makes clear that a district court 
may direct entry of a final judgment under the rule “
 at 7-8, 100 S.Ct. at 1464-65.   
only if the 
court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” 
 See also Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 3, 100 S.Ct. at 1462 
(“[Rule 54(b)] allows a district court dealing with multiple 
claims or multiple parties to direct the entry of final judgment as 
to fewer than all of the claims or parties; to do so, the court must 
make an express determination that there is no just reason for 
delay
Consequently, where an order purports to certify a 
judgment as final under Rule 54(b) but lacks the express 
determination that the rule requires, a court of appeals lacks 
jurisdiction over the order because it is not a “final” judgment 
under either Rule 54(b) or under the traditional standards of 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Thus, Rule 54(b)’s “express” determination is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite.  
.”) (emphasis added).  Otherwise, if the court does not 
make that determination, “any order or other decision, however 
designated” that does not dispose of all claims against all parties 
is not final under Rule 54(b).  
See Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. 
Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 202 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Berckeley II”) (“We 
concluded [in Berckeley I] that . . . an express determination 
[that there is ‘no just reason for delay’] [i]s a jurisdictional 
prerequisite required by Rule 54(b) . . . .”); see also Bhatla v. 
U.S. Capital Corp., 990 F.2d 780, 786 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993) (In the 
absence of an express determination that there is no just reason 
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for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment 
under Rule 54(b), “the order is not final and no appeal is 
possible.”).   
In Allis-Chalmers, we faced the question of whether a 
district court’s formulaic recitation of the “no just reason for 
delay” determination sufficed under Rule 54(b).  See 521 F.2d at 
362.  We determined that mechanical adherence to the rule was 
inadequate and held that “Rule 54(b) requires the district court 
to do more than just recite the 54(b) formula of ‘no just reason 
for delay.’”  Id. at 364.  We concluded that a district court 
granting judgment under Rule 54(b) “should clearly articulate 
the reasons and factors underlying its decision to grant 54(b) 
certification.”5  Id.  In this connection, we adopted the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit’s approach in requiring that a 
district court instead of merely “incorporating in the certificate . 
. . the conclusory language of Rule 54(b), . . . make a brief 
reasoned statement in support of its determination that, ‘there is 
no just reason for delay.’”  Id. (quoting Gumer v. Shearson, 
Hammill & Co., Inc., 516 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1974)).  Thus, 
after Allis-Chalmers, “[w]e consistently require that district 
courts provide a statement of reasons when entering final 
judgment under Rule 54(b).”  Carter, 181 F.3d at 343 (citations 
omitted); see also Waldorf v. Shuta
                                                 
5Curtiss-Wright abrogated our opinion in Allis-Chalmers to the 
extent that we indicated that the presence of a counterclaim 
weighed heavily against a district court’s certification of a Rule 
54(b) judgment.  See Carter, 181 F.3d at 345 n.14.  Our 
requirement of the statement of reasons as set forth in Allis-
Chalmers, however, remains in place.  
, 142 F.3d 601, 610-11 (3d 
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Cir. 1998) (“We consistently have required district courts to 
provide a reasoned opinion as a prerequisite for appellate review 
of a judgment certified as final.”).   
In Carter, however, we determined that, unlike the need 
for an express determination that there is “no just reason for 
delay,” our judicially-imposed requirement under Allis-
Chalmers that a district court set forth a statement of reasons for 
its certification “stands not as a jurisdictional prerequisite but as 
a prophylactic means of enabling the appellate court to ensure 
that immediate appeal will advance the purposes of the rule.”  
181 F.3d at 345.  Accordingly, “the absence of an explanation 
by the district court does not pose a jurisdictional bar when the 
propriety of the appeal may be discerned from the record.”  Id.
B.  The District Court’s Rule 54(b) Certification Lacks 
an “Express” Determination and a Statement of Reasons. 
 
at 346.   
Elliott contends that the portion of the District Court’s 
Rule 54(b) order stating that the parties requested the entry of a 
Rule 54(b) judgment “so that [Elliott’s] appeals may proceed 
before the Third Circuit and may be resolved with finality prior 
to any trial going forward in this matter,” Appellant’s resp. tab 
A at 2, satisfies Rule 54(b)’s “express” determination 
requirement.  Arguably, though we could infer from the Court’s 
order that it agreed with the parties’ statement, we will not 
impute to the Court its summary of the parties’ justification for 
seeking a Rule 54(b) judgment.  Moreover, even if we regarded 
that recitation as the language of the Court, it does not 
incorporate an express determination that there is no just reason 
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for delay.   
At oral argument, Elliott focused on the portion of the 
Rule 54(b) order that states that “it would be most efficient to 
hold a single trial.”  Id.  Yet Elliott does not derive that 
quotation from the District Court’s findings but rather he takes it 
from the Court’s summary of an October 2010 teleconference 
that the Court held prior to denying Rule 54(b) certification the 
first time the parties moved for it.  See id.
The District Court also did not set forth a statement of 
reasons as to why there was no just reason for delay in entry of a 
final judgment as 
 (“On October 13, 
2010, this Court held a teleconference to discuss the parties’ 
Joint Stipulation and Order.  During that teleconference, the 
Court and all parties agreed that it would be most efficient to 
hold a single trial after the resolution of the appeals . . . .”).  In 
any event, the Court’s statement would not reflect the Court’s 
determination that there is no just reason for delay in entry of a 
final judgment; it simply would be an observation of one of the 
advantages of Rule 54(b) certification.  After all, even if we 
assume that disposition of this case in a single trial might 
advance efficiency and that the outcome of this appeal, if we 
exercised jurisdiction, would lead to the Court on remand 
resolving the case with only one trial, it is still possible that 
there might be a just reason for a delay in entry of a final 
judgment.  In any event, the Court did not “expressly 
determine[] that there is no just reason for delay,” nor did it 
employ similar language that could have been intended to 
convey a finding that it had reached such a conclusion. 
Allis-Chalmers required it to do when entering 
a Rule 54(b) final judgment.  The parties argue that the Court’s 
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June 9, 2011 order certifying the entry of a Rule 54(b) judgment 
and its earlier November 30, 2010 order denying entry of such a 
judgment and instead certifying this matter for interlocutory 
appeal together set forth an adequate rationale for the Court’s 
entry of the Rule 54(b) judgment.  We note first that we find 
surprising the parties’ reliance on the Court’s earlier order 
denying a Rule 54(b) judgment.  It is not logical to contend that 
the Court’s reasoning in denying certification under Rule 54(b) 
six months prior to its ultimate certification of the Rule 54(b) 
judgment constitutes a statement of reasons for that later 
certification.  In point of fact, the actual Rule 54(b) order does 
not contain any statement of reasons justifying the Court’s 
decision to certify the entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b).6
In addressing the consequence of the omissions in the 
District Court’s June 9, 2011 order, we first consider the effect 
of the District Court’s failure to make the express finding of “no 
just reason for delay” because, while in 
 
Carter we concluded 
that a district court’s failure to set forth a statement of reasons is 
not a jurisdictional defect so long as a court of appeals may 
ascertain the rationale from the record, see
                                                 
6A comparison of the District Court’s order certifying the Rule 
54(b) judgment with the parties’ stipulation and proposed order 
demonstrates that the Court adopted the parties’ proposed order 
verbatim without providing any additional text.  While the 
Court’s determination to adopt the parties’ proposed order 
verbatim is not in itself problematic, its omission of any 
additional reasoning leads us to question the parties’ contention 
that the Court expressly set forth its reasons for granting a Rule 
54(b) judgment in its certification order.   
 181 F.3d at 345-46, a 
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district court’s failure to include the express determination that 
there is no just reason for delay poses a jurisdictional hurdle, see 
Berckeley II, 455 F.3d at 202-03.  In this vein, we reject the 
parties’ contention that Carter somehow obviates a district 
court’s obligation to make the “express” determination of “no 
just reason for delay” or that under Carter we may overlook the 
district court’s failure to do so.  We rejected this interpretation 
of Carter in Berckeley I, noting that “Carter was concerned with 
whether the court’s failure to articulate the factors discussed in 
Allis-Chalmers divested us of appellate jurisdiction, not whether 
the express determination of ‘no just cause for delay’ was 
required for certification under Rule 54(b).”  See Berckeley
C.  Rule 54(b)’s “Express” Determination Requirement 
 I, 
259 F.3d at 141. 
From the time of our decision in Berckeley I, it has been 
quite clear that a district court when entering a final judgment 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) must make an express finding that there 
is no just reason for delay in entry of the judgment and that its 
failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction over an appeal from 
the judgment.  The exact contours of the district court’s 
obligation, and, more precisely, the question of whether a 
district court must employ the talismanic phrase “no just reason 
for delay” to satisfy Rule 54(b) are, however, open questions in 
this Court.  We came close to settling the matter in Berckeley
In 
 I, 
and we thus begin our discussion of this issue with that case.   
Berckeley I, the district court’s order directed “the 
entry of final judgment” in favor of the plaintiff against one of 
the defendants but the order contained neither ‘“an express 
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determination that there is no just reason for delay,”’ nor “a 
clear indication from the District Court’s rulings that it was 
considering all the questions relevant to a Rule 54(b) 
determination.”  Id. at 140-41 & n.5 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
54(b)).  We observed that “nowhere in the District Court’s 
orders resolving th[e] case did it use the words ‘no just cause for 
delay’ or make any statement of an indisputably similar effect.”  
Id. at 141.  The parties argued that we could overlook the district 
court’s failure in this regard because we could glean the court’s 
intent from “language it used to praise expedition in the 
resolution of the proceedings,” but “[w]e decline[d] to adopt the 
position that general references to the necessity of expedition 
can substitute for the ‘express’ determination required by the 
Rule.”  Id.
In rejecting the 
    
Berckeley I parties’ contention that Carter 
eliminated the “express” determination requirement, we noted 
that only one court, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 
Kelly v. Lee’s Old Fashioned Hamburgers, Inc., 908 F.2d 1218 
(5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (per curiam), has held that, 
notwithstanding a district court’s failure to state expressly in a 
Rule 54(b) order that there was “no just cause for delay,” a court 
of appeals could exercise jurisdiction over an appeal from the 
order.  Berckeley I, 259 F.3d at 142.  In Kelly, a closely divided 
en banc panel held that “[i]f the language in the order appealed 
from, either independently or together with related portions of 
the record referred to in the order, reflects the district court’s 
unmistakable intent to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 
54(b), nothing else is required to make the order appealable.”  
908 F.2d at 1220.  Notably, while the Kelly majority stated its 
holding in terms of a rejection of the notion that a district court 
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is required “to mechanically recite the words ‘no just reason for 
delay,’” id., the majority’s “unmistakable intent” standard 
releases a district court not only from the obligation to state that 
talismanic phrase but also to indicate with any similar language 
that it has made the express determination that Rule 54(b) 
requires.  Thus, in Kelly the majority found that the district 
court’s order, which was captioned “F.R.C.P. 54(b) 
JUDGMENT” and directed “that there be final judgment entered 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b),” satisfied 
Rule 54(b) although it contained no other statements indicating 
that the district court had considered whether there was cause 
for delay.  See id. at 1221.  In contrast, the dissent in Kelly 
interpreted Rule 54(b) to require that a district court either recite 
the talismanic phrase “there is no just reason for delay” or some 
paraphrase thereof to satisfy the “express” determination 
requirement.  See id.
We found 
 at 1222. 
Kelly distinguishable in Berckeley I because 
the district court’s rulings in Berckeley I did not make clear its 
intent to enter a judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) whereas the 
district court in Kelly plainly intended to enter a Rule 54(b) 
judgment.  See Berckeley I, 259 F.3d at 143-44.  On this ground, 
we found the Rule 54(b) order in Berckeley I invalid and 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  See id. at 144-46.  
In Berckeley I, we thus noted that “[t]he manner in which we 
dispose of this case does not require us to address, head on, the 
issue presented in Kelly.  Thus, we leave for another day 
deciding whether the words ‘no just cause for delay’ are 
required in haec verba to confer appellate jurisdiction under 
Rule 54(b).”  Id. at 142 n.7.  We accordingly “abstain[ed] from 
considering the merits of the [Court of Appeals for the] Fifth 
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Circuit’s position in Kelly until an analogous case, one in which 
there is an unmistakable intent to enter judgment under Rule 
54(b) but no express determination of ‘no just cause for delay,’ 
presents itself.”  Id.
Here, the District Court’s intent to enter judgment under 
Rule 54(b) is unmistakable.  The Court’s June 9, 2011 order 
directs that “[f]inal judgment be entered pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 54(b) in favor of” the Institutional Defendants and against 
Elliott “on all claims.”  Appellant’s resp. tab A at 3.  
Nevertheless, in 
 at 145.  That case now has arrived.   
Berckeley I we strongly hinted at our 
inclination to side with the dissenters in Kelly.  We noted that 
the “‘touch the bases’ approach taken by the Kelly dissenters, 
see Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1223, has merit both because it is 
consistent with the plain meaning of Rule 54(b) and because it 
would result in a predictable process by which appeals are taken 
under that rule.”  Berckeley I, 259 F.3d at 142 n.7.  For these 
same reasons, today we conclude that the dissent in Kelly
We hold that even in a case such as this one, in which a 
district court clearly intends to enter judgment pursuant to Rule 
54(b), it must state expressly that it has determined that there is 
no just reason for delay.  If it fails to do so, that judgment is not 
a final judgment under Rule 54(b), and we do not have 
jurisdiction over an appeal from that judgment.  We note that 
although we part ways with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit on this issue, our decision in this case aligns us with the 
positions of the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Ninth, Tenth, 
and District of Columbia Circuits.  
 
offered the correct reading of Rule 54(b).   
See Blackman v. Dist. of 
Columbia, 456 F.3d 167, 175-76 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Stockman’s 
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Water Co., LLC v. Vaca Partners, L.P., 425 F.3d 1263, 1265 
(10th Cir. 2005); Nat’l Assoc. of Home Builders v. Norton, 325 
F.3d 1165, 1167 (9th Cir. 2003); LTV Steel Co. v. United Mine 
Workers (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 928 F.2d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 
1991) (per curiam).7
We also are persuaded, however, that Rule 54(b) does not 
require that a district court use the talismanic phrase “there is no 
just reason for delay.”  The district court may state that it has 
   
                                                 
7The Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Eighth Circuits 
appear to have varied their respective positions on whether an 
“express” determination is required under Rule 54(b).  Compare 
Granack v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 977 F.2d 1143, 1145 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that order certified under Rule 54(b) not appealable 
because certification lacked express determination and stating 
that “[b]y definition, an express determination cannot be made 
implicitly”) and Mooney v. Frierdich, 784 F.2d 875, 876 (8th 
Cir. 1986) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction because 
court failed to set forth any reasoning for its certification and 
failed to make express determination) with Alexander v. 
Chicago Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850, 854-55 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(concluding that order satisfied Rule 54(b) where it lacked 
express determination and direction but parties clearly knew of 
their right to appeal) and United States v. Glenn, 585 F.2d 366, 
367 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978) (rejecting argument that district court’s 
order was not final under Rule 54(b) because it lacked express 
finding where there was “no doubt that the district court 
intended its orders to be final judgments for purposes of 
appeal”).   
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determined expressly that “there is no just reason for delay” 
using those precise words, or it may paraphrase or use language 
“of an indisputably similar effect,” Berckeley
In ascertaining the meaning of Rule 54(b)’s “express” 
determination requirement, we begin, as with any interpretive 
exercise, with the text of the rule.  “The Supreme Court and this 
Court have repeatedly held that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, like any other statute, should be given their plain 
meaning.”  
 I, 259 F.3d at 141, 
so long as the district court’s order clearly contains the 
“express” determination Rule 54(b) requires.     
Berckeley I, 259 F.3d at 142 n.7 (citing Bus. Guides, 
Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 540, 
111 S.Ct. 922, 928 (1991); United States v. Nahodil, 36 F.3d 
323, 328 (3d Cir. 1994)) (some citations omitted); see also 
Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 157 (3d Cir. 2009) (same).  “As 
with a statute, our inquiry is complete if we find the text of the 
Rule to be clear and unambiguous.”  Business Guides
The text of Rule 54(b) is quite plain.
, 498 U.S. 
at 540-41, 111 S.Ct. at 928.   
8
                                                 
8The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Kelly and this 
Court in Berckeley I analyzed the version of Rule 54(b) that 
preceded the current version of the rule.  The earlier version 
provided in relevant part that a district court “may direct the 
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of 
the claims or parties only upon an express determination that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction 
for the entry of judgment.”  See Berckeley I, 259 F.3d at 140.  
The rule provided further that “[i]n the absence of such 
  It provides that 
 
 27 
“the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court 
expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” 
(Emphasis added).  Rule 54(b)’s use of the word “expressly” to 
modify “determines” makes clear that the district court is 
required to determine and to articulate the fact that it has 
determined that there is no just reason for delay.  The plain 
meaning of “express” compels this conclusion.  See Black’s 
Law Dictionary 661 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “express” as 
“[c]learly and unmistakably communicated; directly stated”); 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 803 (Merriam-
Webster 1986) (defining “express” as “directly and distinctly 
stated or expressed rather than implied or left to reference”).  As 
we stated in Berckeley
Under [the dictionary] definition [of ‘express’], 
‘express determination that there is no just reason 
for delay’ can mean only one thing:  The judge’s 
very words must state specifically that he or she 
has decided that there is no just reason for delay.  
 I,  
Kelly
                                                                                                             
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, 
however, designated,” which is not a final judgment as to all 
claims and parties is not a final judgment under Rule 54(b).  Id.  
In 2007, that language was changed to the current form of Rule 
54(b), but the stylistic changes did not change the substance of 
the rule.   
, 908 F.2d at 1222.  Thus, the argument 
proceeds, it is self-evident that the first sentence 
of Rule 54(b) requires an explicit manifestation 
that the district court has determined there is no 
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just cause for delay and directing the entry of final 
judgment. 
259 F.3d at 142 n.7 (some internal quotation marks omitted).  
On this same ground, the dissent in Kelly determined that Rule 
54(b)’s requirement of an “express” determination precludes the 
possibility that a district court’s order may satisfy Rule 54(b) 
where a determination of no just reason for delay is “implied” 
but is not “expressed” in the order.  See Kelly
The second sentence of Rule 54(b) reinforces our 
understanding of the rule.  It  provides that “
, 908 F.2d at 1222-
24.  In light of the straightforward definition of “express,” we 
agree with that conclusion.   
[o]therwise, any 
order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates 
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties” is not a final judgment under Rule 54(b). 
(Emphasis added).  This sentence anticipates the precise 
circumstance in this case, in which the district court designates 
or titles an order to be a Rule 54(b) final judgment but fails to 
make the express determination that the rule requires.  The 
effect of the omission is clear: it renders non-final any purported 
Rule 54(b) judgment in which the district court fails to make the 
“express determination.”  The inclusion of this clarifying 
statement thus “serves to underscore the importance of the 
‘express determination’ requirement.”  Kelly
The 
, 908 F.2d at 1226. 
Kelly majority entirely failed to address the text of 
Rule 54(b) and in the absence of a convincing alternative 
interpretation of the rule, we are persuaded by the dissent’s 
interpretation.  Cf. Taylor v. F.D.I.C., 132 F.3d 753, 760 (D.C. 
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Cir. 1997) (discussing Kelly
We also find persuasive the 
 and noting that “[t]he majority . . . 
never really answered the dissenters’ point that ‘express,’ the 
Rule’s modifier of ‘determination,’ does not normally mean 
‘implied’”).  In short, we conclude that as its text makes plain, 
Rule 54(b) requires that a district court make an “express” 
determination that there is no just reason for delay in entry of a 
final judgment.  This provision means that the district court must 
articulate in the Rule 54(b) order that it has made such a 
determination.   
Kelly dissent’s recitation of 
the background of the 1946 amendments to the rule, which 
added the “express” determination requirement.  As the dissent 
in Kelly noted, prior to 1946, “situations arose where district 
courts made a piecemeal disposition of an action and entered 
what the parties thought amounted to a judgment, although a 
trial remained to be had on other claims. . . .”  Kelly, 908 F.2d at 
1223 (quoting 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore’s 
Federal Practice ¶ 54.01 [6] at 54-15 (2d ed. 1988)).  “In the 
interim the parties did not know their ultimate rights, and 
accordingly took an appeal, thus putting the finality of the 
partial judgment in question.”  Id.  The confusion, waste, and 
expense to litigants that resulted from this uncertainty prompted 
the addition of the certification requirement to Rule 54(b).  See 
Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1223.  If we read Rule 54(b)’s “express” 
determination requirement as requiring no more than that there 
be sufficient evidence in the record from which a court of 
appeals could infer that a district court made an “implied” 
determination that there was no just reason for delay in entry of 
a final judgment, we would vitiate the very intended effect of 
the “express” determination requirement.  On the other hand, as 
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the Kelly
Our interpretation of Rule 54(b) heeds the Supreme 
Court’s direction that we give federal rules their plain meaning.  
 dissent observed, requiring strict compliance with 
Rule 54(b) “avoid[s] protective, duplicative appeals and, most 
importantly, . . . prevent[s] the harsh result of a party’s losing its 
right to appeal because it was not aware that a final, appealable 
judgment had been entered.”  908 F.2d at 1227.   
See Bus. Guides, 498 U.S. at 540, 111 S.Ct. at 928.  Moreover, 
adherence to the rule’s text has the added virtue of maintaining 
the proper respective roles of the district courts and the courts of 
appeals in considering Rule 54(b) orders.  If we regarded a 
judgment as final in the absence of some statement indicating 
that the district court has determined that there is no just reason 
for delay in its entry we would have to assume —  without any 
supporting evidence — that the district court has considered the 
equitable factors that must inform a Rule 54(b) certification.  
See Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 7-8, 100 S.Ct. at 1464-65.  At a 
minimum, in such a scenario it would be quite challenging to 
review the district court’s Rule 54(b) certification for an abuse 
of discretion.  See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Scottsdale 
Ins. Co.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized 
this point with respect to a review for an abuse of discretion in 
, 316 F.3d 431, 440 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We review a 
district court’s Rule 54(b) certification decision for an abuse of 
discretion.”).  After all, how does a court of appeals know if a 
district court has abused its discretion if it does not know the 
basis for its exercise of discretion?   
Mooney v. Frierdich, 784 F.2d 875, 876 (8th Cir. 1986) (per 
curiam), where it said that in determining “whether there was an 
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abuse of discretion” in reviewing a Rule 54(b) certification “if 
no reasons are furnished as to why that discretion was exercised, 
[its] judgment as to the propriety of certification is necessarily 
speculative.”  In reality, if courts of appeals scrutinize the record 
in an attempt to glean whether the district court impliedly 
fulfilled its obligation to make an “express” determination under 
Rule 54(b) they will come dangerously close to making the 
determination themselves, thereby appropriating the district 
courts’ “dispatcher” function under the rule.  See Curtiss-Wright 
Corp., 446 U.S. at 8, 100 S.Ct. at 1465.  “Discretion to 
determine whether an immediate appeal should be allowed is, 
‘with good reason, vested by the rule primarily in the discretion 
of the District Court as the one most likely to be familiar with 
the case and with any justifiable reasons for delay.’”  New York 
Football Giants, Inc. v. Comm’r, 349 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 
2003) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co.
Although we conclude that Rule 54(b) requires an 
“express” determination, we do not believe that the rule requires 
that a district court employ the talismanic phrase “there is no 
just reason for delay” prior to entry of a final judgment.  
Undoubtedly, such a rigid requirement has the virtue of clarity 
and predictability in application and we suggest that when the 
language of the rule reflects a district court’s conclusion that the 
court use it.  In this regard, we point out that the further a district 
court departs from the language of Rule 54(b) the greater the 
possibility that a court of appeals may conclude that the district 
court has not satisfied the requirements of the rule.  Yet Rule 
54(b)’s text does not require the court to employ those precise 
words; it simply requires it to employ — expressly — some set 
, 351 U.S. at 437, 76 S.Ct. 
at 900-01).   
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of words conveying that it has made the Rule 54(b) 
determination.  See Kelly
Of course, a district court most easily will satisfy Rule 
54(b) by stating as we have suggested that it has determined that 
“there is no just reason for delay.”  But it also may satisfy Rule 
54(b) by paraphrasing that statement or using other language of 
“indisputably similar effect,” 
, 908 F.2d at 1222 (“[A]t least 
arguably, since the rule does not specifically require incantation 
of the seven very words [‘there is no just reason for delay’], they 
could be paraphrased, provided that the court actually states that 
it had made that required determination.”) (Smith, J., 
dissenting).  Nor do we believe that we ought to impose such a 
per se rule on the district courts.   
Berckeley
Significantly, it should be clear from the precedents we 
have cited that we do not impose today a new or onerous 
requirement on the district courts and this opinion should not 
 I, 259 F.3d at 141, in its 
order that plainly reflects that it has determined that there is no 
just reason for delay.  As way of illustrative example, if a district 
court expressly states that it could ascertain “no just cause for 
delaying entry of final judgment” as to certain claims or parties, 
or that it has determined that there is “no legitimate reason for 
delaying entry of final judgment,” such statements would reflect 
the district court’s determination that there is no just reason for 
delay.  Allowing paraphrases of “no just reason for delay” to 
satisfy Rule 54(b) strikes the appropriate balance between 
adherence to Rule 54(b)’s strict requirements and a recognition 
that a district court can set forth an express determination that 
there is no just reason for delay without using those exact words. 
 In such a situation, Rule 54(b) is satisfied.   
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come as a surprise.  Rule 54(b)’s “express” determination 
requirement has been facially evident from the rule’s text since 
its amendment in 1946 added the requirement.  Yet it also is 
evident that notwithstanding the numerous cases discussing the 
rule it is not understood clearly and is sometimes misapplied.  
As this case well demonstrates, this misapplication causes 
considerable delay and undoubtedly leads to the parties being 
required to bear additional costs unless, of course, attorneys 
absorb these costs.   
This problem in the application of Rule 54(b) persists 
even though in imposing the “statement of reasons” requirement 
in Allis-Chalmers over 30 years ago we clearly proceeded from 
the belief that Rule 54(b) requires that a district court explicitly 
set forth its determination that there is no just reason for delay.  
See Allis-Chalmers, 521 F.2d at 364 (“A proper exercise of 
discretion under Rule 54(b) requires the district court to do more 
than just recite the 54(b) formula of ‘no just reason for delay.’”) 
(emphasis added).  Indeed, Allis-Chalmers
Though we realize that our disposition of this appeal will 
cause some efforts expended on this appeal to have been wasted 
and surely will cause delay in the disposition of this case, we 
may not ignore the plain requirements of Rule 54(b) to satisfy 
our desire to avoid this waste and delay.  The absence of an 
“express” determination is a jurisdictional defect, which we may 
 sets upon the district 
courts a far more significant burden, and, if a district court 
complies with it and sets forth a statement of reasons for its Rule 
54(b) certification, it is a near certainty that the order will 
contain, by virtue of that discussion, an express determination 
that there is no just reason for delay.   
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not overlook no matter how significantly the judicial equities 
may weigh in favor hearing the appeal.  See McBeth v. Himes
In summary, today we make clear that Rule 54(b) means 
what it says: a district court may certify a judgment under Rule 
54(b) only after concluding “that there is no just reason for 
delay.”  A Rule 54(b) order will be valid and provide this Court 
with jurisdiction over the appeal only if it expressly sets forth 
that determination, though not necessarily in those precise 
words.  The District Court here failed to state in its order that it 
had determined that there was “no just reason for delay” and it 
failed to use any other language of indisputably similar effect.  
Accordingly, the order did not properly certify the judgment 
under Rule 54(b).  Without a valid Rule 54(b) judgment, we do 
not have jurisdiction over this appeal as it resolved fewer than 
all the claims of all the parties, and thus, it is not “final” within 
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
, 
598 F.3d 708, 722 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[E]fficiency for the parties 
and the court can[not] provide a reason to overlook a 
jurisdictional deficiency caused by a failure to comply with Rule 
54(b).”).  
See Hill v. City of Scranton, 
411 F.3d 118, 124 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Without a valid Rule 54(b) 
order, we do not ordinarily have appellate jurisdiction over a 
district court order that resolves fewer than all the claims of all 
the parties in a single action because such orders do not 
constitute ‘final decisions’ per 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”) (citation 
omitted).  Accordingly, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.9
                                                 
9 At the conclusion of argument on this appeal Elliott made an 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss this appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction.  Our dismissal is without prejudice; thus the 
parties may seek from the District Court a proper certification 
under Rule 54(b) and if it is granted Elliott may appeal once 
more.  In the event that the parties choose to pursue that course, 
the parties may seek leave from this Court to rely on the 
extensive briefs and supporting materials that they already have 
supplied to this Court attendant to the present appeal to be 
supplemented by additional materials evidencing the 
proceedings in the District Court after this dismissal.  If there is 
another appeal, the Clerk of the Court should reassign the matter 
to a new panel in accordance with this Court’s procedure.  The 
parties will bear their own costs on this appeal. 
 
                                                                                                             
oral motion to which there was no objection to remand the case 
to the District Court so that the parties could make an 
application to that Court for entry of a Rule 54(b) judgment in 
proper form.   We deny this motion as it was untimely.  We 
believe that our Clerk’s order of July 12, 2011, should have 
alerted the parties as to our want of jurisdiction and caused them 
to take corrective steps at that time.   
